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UNITED STATES DETENTION OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

By Matthew C. Waxman*
INTRODUCTION
Looking back on US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan to
date, three key issues stand out: one substantive, one procedural and one
policy. The substantive matter – what are the minimum baseline treatment
standards required as a matter of international law? – has clarified
significantly during the course of operations there, largely as a result of the
US Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1 The procedural
matter – what adjudicative processes does international law require for
determining who may be detained? – eludes consensus and has become more
controversial the longer the Afghan conflict continues. And the policy matter
– in waging counterinsurgency warfare, how do foreign military forces
transition military detention operations to effective civilian institutions? –
has emerged as a critical strategic priority for which the law of armed
conflict provides little instructive guidance.
After briefly outlining the basis of US and coalition detention operations,
this article addresses each of these issues in turn. It concludes with some
general observations about the convergence of law and strategy.
I. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AND DETENTION
OPERATIONS
In late 2001, the United States launched operations in Afghanistan, and
almost immediately began capturing and holding suspected enemy fighters.2
The United States’ legal authority for detention operations in Afghanistan
began from the propositions that:

*
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Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (U.S.A.); Adjunct Senior Fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National
Security and Law. An earlier version of this paper was presented at and published by the
U.S. Naval War College.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
See T. Bowman & G. Gibson, “U.S. Still Mulling Options on POWs”, Baltimore Sun,
Dec. 8, 2001, at A1; P. Richter, “U.S. Lays Plans for Interrogation, Trials”, L.A. Times,
Dec. 12, 2001, at A1.
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The United States and its coalition partners are engaged in a war against
al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their affiliates and supporters. There is no
question that under the law of armed conflict, the United States has the
authority to detain persons who have engaged in unlawful belligerence
until the cessation of hostilities. Like other wars, when they start we do
not know when they will end. Still, we may detain combatants until the
end of the war.3
Although many US allies participated in military operations there, US forces
took the lead in conducting detention operations in Afghanistan,4 eventually
consolidating theater detention operations at facilities in Bagram air force
base.
As explained by a commander of US detention forces in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF), “[d]uring the execution of this campaign, the US
Armed Forces and allied forces have captured or procured the surrender of
thousands of individuals believed to be members or supporters of either al
Qaeda or the Taliban”.5 The purpose of these detentions has been to
[prevent] them from returning to the battlefield and engaging in further
armed attacks against innocent civilians and U.S. and coalition forces.
Detention also serves as a deterrent against future attacks by denying the
enemy the fighters needed to conduct war. Interrogations during
detention enable the United States to gather important intelligence to
prevent future attacks.6
Seven years after the initial invasion, US detention operations go on, and the
US military is modernizing its facilities in the expectation of their further

3
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5
6

UN Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in
1999, Addendum (United States of America) Annex 1, at 47, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3
(May 6, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm#part_one;
see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-21 (2004) (recognizing the executive
branch’s authority to detain enemy combatants – at least those captured in the course of
operations in Afghanistan – pursuant to the congressional “Authorization for Use of
Military Force” against those responsible for the September 11 attacks).
As well as transferring several hundred detainees from Afghanistan to Guantanamo,
though I do not discuss those legal issues here.
Declaration of Colonel R.M. Miller, para. 8, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01707
(GK) (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2006).
Id.
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continuation.7 While the new Obama Administration has pledged to close
Guantanamo early in its tenure, plans for continued detention operations in
Afghanistan move forward.8
In some respects US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan
are a valuable case study for examining contemporary application of the law
of armed conflict. Aside from the thousands of individual detentions, the
“data” include publicly released and declassified documents of internal US
government legal and policy decision-making, as well as litigation that has
pushed the US government to clarify its legal positions and has produced
judicial interpretations of the law of armed conflict.
In others respect, however, it is difficult to examine the law of armed
conflict in the Afghanistan setting because of some peculiar aspects of
detention operations there. First, most US allies participating in coalition
operations in Afghanistan have done so not as part of anti-Taliban and Al
Qaeda combat operations (Operation Enduring Freedom) but as part of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The latter, which assists the
Afghan government in maintaining security in certain parts of the country, is
authorized by a series of Chapter VII UN Security Council resolutions that
authorize participating contingents to “take all necessary measures to fulfil
its mandate”.9 Participating military forces therefore derive authority to
detain certain captured militants from this UN Security Council mandate
independent of the law of armed conflict. Additionally, US allies
participating in both OEF and ISAF have almost entirely “opted out” of
detention operations. In 2005, NATO adopted guidelines, which the
European partners follow, calling for transferring detainees to the Afghan
government within ninety-six hours of capture.10 As explained further below,
this has meant that US detentions form almost the only significant body of
State practice in Afghanistan to measure against or help interpret the law of
armed conflict related to detention.

7
8
9
10

See E. Schmitt & T. Golden, “U.S. Planning Big New Prison in Afghanistan”, N.Y. Times,
May 17, 2008, at A01.
See W. Richey, “Next Flash Point over Terror Detainees: Bagram Prison”, Christian
Science Monitor, Feb.12, 2009.
See S.C. Res. 1707, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1707 (Sept. 12, 2006); S C. Res. 1386,
para. 3, S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001).
See A.S. Deeks, “Starting From Here”, in International Law and Military Operations (M.
D. Carsten ed., 2008) (84 US Naval War College Int’l L. Studies Series).
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II. DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS
In the early phases of military operations in Afghanistan, but especially after
the Abu Ghraib crisis in Iraq, followed by gruesome disclosures of detainee
abuses in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, the greatest public controversy
focused on the issue of detainee treatment standards. Much of this debate
centered on the appropriate classification of captured Taliban and Al Qaeda
fighters, because most protagonists in this debate believed that the
appropriate treatment baseline turned in part on captured individuals’ legal
status.11
On October 17, 2001, shortly before conventional combat operations
began, US military commanders in charge of Afghanistan operations issued
an order instructing that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were to be applied to
all captured individuals. Belligerents would be screened according to
standard doctrine to determine whether or not they were entitled to prisoner
of war status.12 This was consistent with existing military regulations and
recent US military practice.
On February 7, 2002, however, the President determined that Taliban and
Al Qaeda detainees were “unlawful combatants”,13 and therefore protected
by neither the custodial standards of the Third Geneva Convention
applicable to prisoners of war nor common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.14 Prisoner of war protections did not cover Al Qaeda detainees
11
12
13

14

See A. Roberts, “The Prisoner Question: If the U.S. Has Acted Lawfully, What’s the
Furor About?”, Washington Post, Feb. 3, 2002, at B1.
See J.R. Schlesinger et al., Final Report of the Independent Panel To Review Detention
Operations 80 (2004), at: news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf.
See Memorandum from G. Bush to Vice President et al., “Humane Treatment of Al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees” (Feb. 7, 2002), repr. in The Torture Papers – The Road to
Abu Ghraib 134 (K.J. Greenberg & J. Dratel eds., 2005), at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf
[hereinafter: President’s Memo].
Art. 3 is referred to as “common” because it is found identically in each of the four 1949
Geneva Conventions. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949, Art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, Art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, Art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter: Geneva
Convention III]; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, 1949, Art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter: Geneva Convention IV]; all repr. in
Documents on the Laws of War (A. Roberts & R. Guelff eds., 3d ed., 2000) at 197, 222,
244 and 301, respectively. Art. 3 applies to all cases “… of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contacting Parties . .
.”.
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because Al Qaeda was not a “High Contracting Party” to the Conventions,
and they did not cover Taliban because those forces failed the tests of Article
4 of the Third Convention, which stipulates requirements for legitimate
military forces.15 Common Article 3 did not apply, by its own terms, because
this was believed to be an international armed conflict, whereas Common
Article 3 rules apply in conflicts “not of an international character”.16
The President further directed in his February 2002 instructions, however,
that “[a]s a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue
to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva”.17
But while ostensibly protective, this directive also opened holes in the law of
armed conflict’s barriers. First, it applied by its terms only to armed forces,
hinting that intelligence services might not be similarly constrained. Second,
by emphasizing humane treatment as a matter of policy, it suggested that
humane treatment was not required as a matter of law. And third it suggested
that the Geneva Conventions’ principles could validly be compromised in
pursuit of security requirements.
Well known is the storm of criticism that erupted over the initial US
government position that the Geneva Conventions – and, presumably,
customary law of armed conflict – provided no legal guarantee of minimum
detention treatment standards. Many critics have attributed detainee abuses
in Afghanistan to these foundational legal decisions. Critics of the US
position consistently rejected the notion that unlawful combatants fall into a
“legal gap” in protection, and they asserted a range of plugs, including that
captured fighters (at least Taliban) were entitled to prisoner of war status;
that all captured fighters are entitled at least to minimum protections of
Common Article 3, Article 75 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions,18 and the customary law of armed conflict; and/or that any
detainees are protected by international human rights law, including
prohibitions on “cruel, inhuman and degrading” treatment.19

15

16
17
18

19

See President’s Memo, supra note 13. For a contrary view, see Memorandum from W.H.
Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State to Counsel to the President, Comments on Your
Paper on the Geneva Conventions (Feb. 2, 2002), repr. in Torture Papers, supra note 13,
at 129, at: http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf).
See President’s Memo, supra note 13.
Id.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, Art. 4, 1125
U.N.T.S. 4, repr. in Documents on the Laws of War, supra note 14, at 422.
See J.B. Bellinger, US State Dep’t Legal Advisor, “Oxford Leverhulme Programme
Lecture on the Changing Character of War”, (Dec.10, 2007).
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In June 2006 the US Supreme Court resolved much of this debate, at least
as a matter of international law incorporated into US law. It held in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, a petition brought by a Yemeni detained during OEF and
transferred to Guantanamo, that common Article 3 affords minimal
protections to individuals captured within the territory of a signatory but
engaged in a conflict not between two nations. This would include not only
civil wars (as common Article 3 is more traditionally understood) but also
conflicts with transnational actors like Al Qaeda.20 Soon after, on July 7,
2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that “all DoD personnel
adhere to [common Article 3] standards” and that each Department
component “review all relevant directives, regulations, policies, practices
and procedures . . . to ensure that they comply with [them]”.21
Hamdan’s holding that common Article 3’s minimum treatment
standards apply to individuals captured in Afghanistan significantly
narrowed the scope of controversy over international legal constraints on US
detention operations. Common Article 3 demands that detainees “in all
circumstances be treated humanely”, and it prohibits, among other things,
“cruel treatment and torture” as well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment”.22 Some of these terms are
vague. But they contain basic care and custody requirements that match
closely the minimal treatment standards of human rights law that many
critics argued applied.23 While not matching the enhanced protections
afforded prisoners of war, this holding nevertheless answered the criticism of
those critics who argued that the Geneva Conventions contain no “gaps” in
their coverage of individuals detained in armed conflict. Perhaps most
important, this holding clarified that these minimal treatment standards apply
as a matter of treaty law of armed conflict, not merely policy.
III. DETENTION ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURES
The Hamdan holding went far in clarifying the minimal treatment standards
applicable to Afghanistan detention operations, but the sparse terms of
20
21

22
23

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra note 1, at 629-31.
Memorandum from G. England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the
Military Departments et al., “Application of Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions
to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense”, (July 7, 2006), at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/home/dodupdate/For-the-record/documents/20060711.html.
Supra note 14.
See International Committee of the Red Cross, “US Detention Related to the Fight
Against Terrorism – the Role of the ICRC”, Feb. 24, 2009, at:
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/united-states-detention-faq-240209.
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common Article 3 do little to clarify the separate issue of what minimal
procedural requirements govern decisions to detain or continue to detain
individuals in Afghanistan.24 Procedural mechanisms for reviewing detention
decisions in Afghanistan have received remarkably little public scrutiny
compared with those at Guantanamo, even though in many respects – at least
as initially characterized by the US government – the detainees in both are
similarly situated. Thus far the war in Afghanistan does more to highlight the
difficult issue of procedural safeguards in the law of armed conflict than it
does to answer it.
In the early phases of coalition operations in Afghanistan, much of the
legal debate about procedural detention issues focused on Article 5 of the
Third Geneva Convention, the Prisoner of War Convention. It provides that
“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy” qualify as
prisoners of war, “such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal”.25 Then, as now, however, little State practice or detailed
authoritative commentary existed interpreting these terms. US military
regulations called for a three officer panel that would take testimony from
reasonably available witnesses, including the detainee, and make
judgments.26 And US military forces were preparing to conduct such
tribunals for individuals captured in Afghanistan until they were directed
otherwise, eventually by the President’s February 7, 2002 legal
determinations which rendered any captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters
“unlawful combatants” as a matter of law; hence there was not “any doubt”
as to their status for Article 5 tribunals to adjudicate.27
Some critics contested this claim, arguing that Article 5 requires case-bycase determinations; that group designations of this sort are impermissible.28
Others have argued that this provision means that when there is doubt
24

25
26

27
28

Some of the sparse State practice on this issue, for example US practice during the
Vietnam War and procedures employed by Canadian and British militaries, is described
in R. Chesney & J. Goldsmith, “Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military
Detention Models”, 60 Stanford L. Rev. 1079, 1090-92 (2008).
Geneva Convention III, supra note 14, Art 5.
See Headquarters, Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine
Corps, Army Regulation 190–8/OPNAVINST 3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461.1, Enemy
Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees § 1-6(a)
(1997), at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/ar190-8.pdf.
See K.Q. Seelye, “Detainees Are Not P.O.W.’s, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare”, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 2002, at A6.
See M. Ratner, “Letter to the Editor, When Are Captives Prisoners of War?”, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 2002, at A18.
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whether a captured individual is even an enemy fighter or not, he is entitled
to a hearing before a tribunal; therefore, the argument goes, suspected Al
Qaeda and Taliban combatants in US custody at Guantanamo and elsewhere
should have been entitled upon capture to such review.29 Article 5’s
language begins with the notion that a subject detainee has “committed a
belligerent act”, suggesting that the drafters intended to mandate minimum
procedures for resolving factual doubt as to a subject’s type of combatant or
belligerent, not the prior question whether he is or is not a combatant.
Nevertheless, in practice any process to adjudicate an individual’s type of
combatancy, and hence the Geneva protections to which he is entitled, would
likely uncover some cases of mistaken identity or otherwise erroneous
detentions.30
Regardless of its precise meaning, it seems quite clear that Article 5 was
drafted with very different circumstances in mind than those of the
Afghanistan conflict. In particular, it was intended for a conflict pitting
professional armies and of limited duration.31 A relatively simple front-end
adjudicatory review was sufficient in such conflicts because sorting
combatants from noncombatants (for detention purposes) was relatively easy
and conflicts would likely end within a few months or years anyway,
whereupon any remaining captives would be released. Afghanistan, by
contrast, involves a set of conflicts already lasting over seven years and
likely to continue many more and an enemy force (especially Al Qaeda
forces, but also residual Taliban) that routinely obscures its identity among
civilian populations.32
In this context, the more important issue than appropriate front-end status
screening is to what form of review and perhaps adversarial process are
detainees entitled to contest the factual basis of their detention, given the
relatively high probability and cost of errors. Three main positions have
emerged, though there are many sub-positions within each one.33
29
30

31
32
33

See, e.g., W.M. Reisman, “Rasul v. Bush: A Failure to Apply International Law”, 2 J.
Int’l Crim. Just. 973 (2004).
In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the US military conducted about twelve hundred such
hearings for captured Iraqi individuals thought to be pro-Saddam fighters, and found
about nine hundred of them to be displaced civilians, who were promptly released. See
Dep’t of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress 578 (2002).
Commentary on Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(ICRC, J.S. Pictet ed., 1960).
See M.C. Waxman, “Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of
Suspected Terrorists”, 108 Columbia L. Rev. 1365 (2008).
For a discussion of this debate, see M. Hakimi, “International Standards for Detaining
Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide”, 33 Yale J.
Int’l L. 369, 389-92 (2008).
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The United States has generally taken the position that the law of armed
conflict is the exclusive body of international law dictating procedural
constraints on detention of captured fighters in Afghanistan. This position
assumes the continued existence of armed conflict (in the US view, it
remains an international armed conflict, though Hamdan at least adds new
questions to this view), and that the law of armed conflict operates as lex
specialis displacing otherwise applicable legal norms.34 Beyond consistently
arguing against the reach of judicial habeas corpus protections to
Afghanistan,35 however, the US government has not articulated any clear
procedural mandates imposed by the law of armed conflict for sorting out
who is or is not a combatant. Instead it has preferred to maintain flexibility,
relying (as explained further below) on procedural mechanisms adopted as a
matter of policy.
Some human rights organizations have taken the position that, especially
since the establishment of the new Afghan government following the 2002
Loya Jirga, international human rights law, not the law of armed conflict,
governs procedural protections, along with Afghan domestic law.36 This
view generally assumes that the war in Afghanistan evolved from an
international armed conflict to an internal armed conflict and that the law of
armed conflict provides no independent authorization for detention in the
latter category.37 Holders of this view look to – among other sources – the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states:
34

35

36

37

See J.B. Bellinger, US State Dep’t Legal Advisor, “Remarks to the Committee Against
Torture”, (May 5, 2006), at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68557.htm;
Bellinger, supra note 19.
See, e.g., Government’s Motion to Dismiss, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, Civ. Action No. 06CV-01669 (JDB), D.D.C., Filed Mar. 5, 2007; Government’s Response to Order to Show
Cause and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, Civ.
Action No. 06-CV-01707 (GK), filed Nov. 20, 2006, D.D.C. The Obama Administration
has so far indicated it will retain this position, opposing federal habeas jurisdiction at
Bagram. See C. Savage, “Obama Upholds Detainee Policy in Afghanistan”, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 2009; N. Pickler & M. Apuzzo, “Obama Backs Bush: No Rights for Bagram
Prisoners”, Assoc. Press, Feb. 21, 2009.
See “Arbitrary Justice: Trials of Bagram and Guantanamo Detainees in Afghanistan”,
Human Rights First, Apr. 2008; T. Golden & D. Rohde, “Afghans Hold Secret Trials for
Men That U.S. Detained”, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2008, at A6 (citing criticisms from human
rights organizations).
Human Rights Watch has taken the position that the transfer of power in Afghanistan to
the Karzai government converted the conflict from an international one to a noninternational one. See Human Rights Watch, Enduring Freedom, Mar. 7, 2004, Part IV,
at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/03/07/enduring-freedom.
It explains: “During a non-international armed conflict, international humanitarian law as
the lex specialis (specialized law) takes precedence, but does not replace, human rights
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No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law . . . Anyone
who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if
the detention is not lawful.38
Under the strictest form of this view, any long-term detention of suspected
Taliban or Al Qaeda agents in Afghanistan requires criminal trial with
universally-recognized due process safeguards; a standard that leaves US
practice in Afghanistan falling far short.39
A third view holds that neither the law of armed conflict nor human rights
treaty law provide sufficiently clear or comprehensive procedural safeguards
to persons detained for security reasons. Thus, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) has developed a set of principles and safeguards
that should govern security detention in all circumstances, i.e., in both armed
conflicts and outside of them. The guidelines are based on law of armed
conflict and human rights treaty rules, as well as on non-binding standards
and best practice, and are to be interpreted on a case by case basis.
According to the guidelines, detainees have – among other things – the right
to challenge the lawfulness of their detention and to have an independent and
impartial body decide on continued detention or release.40 The ICRC
considers that Afghanistan is a situation of non-international armed conflict:
it would argue that detainees in US or other international force hands should
enjoy far more robust procedural rights than currently afforded and that
detainees in Afghan custody should be granted judicial review.41

38
39

40

41

law. … [W]here [international humanitarian law] is absent, vague, or inapplicable, human
rights law standards still apply”. Id.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
See, e.g., “US Detentions in Afghanistan: An Aide-Memoire for Continued Action”,
Amnesty International, June 7, 2005, at:
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/093/2005/en/domAMR510932005en.pdf (“When [the] armed conflict ended [in 2002], those who were
captured by the USA during hostilities . . . were required to be released, unless charged
with criminal offenses. Civilians detained in that conflict . . . too were required, when that
conflict ended, to be released, unless charged with recognized criminal offences”).
See ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed
Conflicts”, Official Working Document of the 30th International Conference of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Nov. 2007, Annex 1; J. Pejic, “Procedural Principles
and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other
Situations of Violence”, 87 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 375 (2005).
See ICRC, “US Detention Related to the Events of 11 September 2001 and Its Aftermath
– The Role of the ICRC”, July 30, 2008, at:
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The experience in Afghanistan offers intuitive support for the third
approach, but it does little to resolve the difficult issue of exactly which
international human rights law provisions should apply. The fact that the
nature of fighting there – an enemy that deliberately obscures its identity and
moves in and out of local communities – creates a high likelihood of
erroneous, long-term detentions supports the call for thorough screening
procedures.42 But the combat conditions, resource constraints and weak state
of Afghan justice would complicate efforts to establish formal judicial
mechanisms by either coalition or the Afghan governments.43
Meanwhile, the US Supreme Court recently held in Boumediene v. Bush
that enemy combatants at Guantanamo are entitled to constitutional habeas
corpus rights.44 The issue of Boumediene’s reach beyond Guantanamo,
especially to Afghanistan, will be litigated for some time, though that case
turned on interpretation and application of US domestic law. In any event,
the Supreme Court did not clarify exactly what procedural structures and
protections apply even in habeas cases for Guantanamo detainees, and the
Court seemed to have Afghanistan in mind when it cautiously suggested that
practical considerations and exigencies of foreign combat zones might limit
the reach of constitutional habeas rights to enemy combatant detainees
beyond Guantanamo.45
Law aside, US forces have instituted more formalized procedural
mechanisms for adjudicating detention decisions as time has gone on.46 The
little detail on review processes in Afghanistan shared openly by the US
government appears mostly in court filings in habeas corpus actions brought
by Bagram detainees. These documents explain that by 2006 all individuals
brought to theater detention facilities for long-term confinement have their
cases reviewed by a five-officer panel, sitting as an Enemy Combatant
Review Board, usually within seventy-five days of capture and thereafter
every six months. The Review Board may recommend by a majority vote to
the commanding general or his designee whether the individual should
continue to be detained.47 Note that while the US government maintains that

42
43
44
45
46
47

http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/usa-detention-update-121205?opendocument.
See Waxman, supra note 32, at 1402-29.
How much these efforts would be complicated is the source of significant debate between
the US government and human rights organizations.
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
See ibid., at 2259-62.
For a general discussion of how enemy combatant adjudications have evolved during the
course of the “Global War on Terrorism”, see Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 24.
See Declaration of Col. J.W. Gray, para. 11-13, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-01669
(JDB) (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2007)(discussing review process for detainees in Afghanistan);
Declaration of Col. R.M. Miller, para. 10-12, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01707
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the Fourth Geneva Convention is inapplicable as a matter of law to
Afghanistan detainees because that Convention applies to civilians, not
combatants, the processes US forces eventually put in place roughly track
the requirements of Article 78, which calls for, among other things, regular
processes and periodic review (at least every six months) for security
internees.48
So far, then, the Afghanistan case has produced little legal consensus on
minimum procedural requirements in part because the spectrum of views
span differing judgments on such basic questions as what type of conflict
exists (international versus internal), what body of law applies (law of armed
conflict versus human rights law versus domestic Afghan law, or some
combination), and what specific minimum requirements those bodies of law
impose (mandatory provisions versus a sliding scale depending on
practicability). Meanwhile, US forces have adopted increasingly robust
processes for adjudicating cases, suggesting at least a partial – though still
far from complete – convergence between the aspirations of restrictive legal
views and the pragmatic and ethical tendencies of those charged with waging
the conflict.
IV. TRANSITIONING DETENTION OPERATIONS
TO CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS
A final issue to consider is the transition from a military detention to civilian
criminal justice system in Afghanistan. Unlike the substantive and
procedural standards issues discussed above, this is not a law of armed
conflict issue in a strict sense (except for Geneva Convention rules
governing repatriation). But it is entwined with the other legal issues, and the
strategic necessity of resolving it effectively has implications for the future
development of the law of armed conflict.
The law of armed conflict is generally understood as designed to
minimize unnecessary suffering in wartime and to facilitate a return to peace
and public order. In the context of conventional warfare, the law of armed
conflict’s detention authorities and rules generally serve well these goals:
until order is restored through victory or settlement of the conflict they allow
– with reduced procedural requirements compared to peacetime justice
systems – the incapacitation of captured individuals presumed (or assessed)
likely to fight again if released and they protect those individuals from
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mistreatment. For the most part, the rules align with the law’s policy
objectives, including the strategic necessities of detention during combat.
US detention operations have taken place in Afghanistan amid a different
and more complex strategic environment. Operations have evolved to
include a major counterinsurgency component against Taliban and al Qaeda
forces conducting guerrilla-style and terrorist operations aimed to undermine
the new Afghan government. Of course, the role and rules of detention in
counterinsurgency conflicts is not a new problem or unique problem. One
aspect that distinguishes the Afghanistan case, however, is the weakness or
embryonic condition of State institutions, including law and order systems,
which needed to be almost completely reconstituted after coalition and
Afghan forces overthrew the Taliban in 2001. Indeed, the collapse or
weakness of governance in many parts of the country and the inability of the
State to provide basic State services like policing and criminal justice creates
an environment hospitable to insurgent forces.49 Moreover, the Afghan
government lacks effective institutions of governance, including a police and
justice sector capable of maintaining order. This is not just a
counterinsurgency campaign to save a mature government but a
counterinsurgency campaign while building a new government in a region
long accustomed to warlordism.
Against this backdrop, 2004 Pentagon inspection and assessment of US
detention operations in Afghanistan concluded that “US detainee operations
can only be normalized by the emergence of an Afghan justice and
corrections system that can assume the responsibility for the long-term
detention of low level enemy combatants currently held by the US”.50 The
report continued:
The value of continuing to keep low-level enemy combatants in custody
is simply to keep individuals that represent a proven threat to coalition
forces off the battlefield. This is a function that can and should be
undertaken by the Afghan government. . . . Despite efforts to improve the
process, the press of a growing detainee population without an Afghan
solution or continued transfer to GTMO will continue to create the
potential for bad choices to be made at several points in that process.51
In 2005 the governments of the United States and Afghanistan reached
diplomatic agreements to “allow for the gradual transfer of Afghan detainees
49
50
51
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to the exclusive custody and control of the Afghan Government”.52 But this
gradual transition has been slowed since then by the shakiness of Afghan
security institutions and inability to put in place domestic legal authorities
and processes capable of handling or prosecuting captured militants.53
These contextual factors raise several policy questions onto which the
law of armed conflict no longer maps so neatly: does the long-term reliance
on military detention strengthen versus deplete or build versus undermine
public confidence in parallel civilian justice institutions? As coalition forces
turn over more and more security and governance functions to Afghan
authorities, how should responsibility for detaining militants, including those
already in custody, be transferred? Many features of this conflict are unique
to Afghanistan, but these basic problems could likely recur in other areas
where governance collapses, such as Somalia.
One set of the lessons that the US military appears to have drawn in
Afghanistan, as well as Iraq, is the strategic imperative of high substantive
and procedural standards of detainee treatment, especially when seeking to
bolster rule of law institutions.54 The Army and Marine Corps’ new
Counterinsurgency Field Manual emphasizes these principles, not only for
legal and ethical reasons, but also for military effectiveness.55 After noting,
for example, that the “nature of [counterinsurgency] operations sometimes
makes it difficult to separate potential detainees from innocent bystanders,
since insurgents lack distinctive uniforms and deliberately mingle with the
local populace”,56 the Manual goes on to warn that “treating a civilian like an
insurgent is a sure recipe for failure”.57 It continues:
[Counterinsurgency] operations strive to restore order, the rule of law,
and civil procedures to the authority of the [host nation] government. . . .
Multinational and U.S. forces brought in to support this objective must
remember that the populace will scrutinize their actions. People will
watch to see if Soldiers and Marines stay consistent with this avowed
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purpose. Inconsistent actions furnish insurgents with valuable issues for
manipulation and propaganda.58
While the law of armed conflict has little to say directly on the issue of
transferring detention responsibilities from military to civilian systems, the
substantive and procedural legal issues described earlier indirectly relate to
this transition process insofar as adherence to their standards helps lay a
foundation of support and legitimacy upon which rule of law can be built.
CONCLUSION
These military doctrinal emphases on detention standards imply several
conclusions about the future development and refinement of the law of
armed conflict, bringing the discussion back to the legal controversies
discussed earlier. As to substantive treatment standards, the strategic
rationale is likely to further reinforce the idea of universally applicable
minimum requirements, despite initial efforts by the Bush administration to
reserve greater flexibility. As to procedural requirements, in thinking about
the future trajectory of the law of armed conflict (or the application of
human rights law in armed conflict), the more that rule-of-law promotion
features as a strategic objective the more robust procedural protections for
detainees will align with military necessity, rather than collide with it. While
this convergence is unlikely to produce legal consensus anytime soon, it
narrows the debate and allows for more constructive dialogue between
competing schools of legal thought.
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